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OPPORTUNITIES FOR REGULATORY
ARBITRAGE UNDER THE EUROPEAN

ECONOMIC COMMUNITY'S FINANCIAL
SERVICES DIRECTIVES AND RELATED
UNITED STATES REGULATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION

The European Economic Community ("EEC")' directives for banks
and investment firms dictate financial and operational regulation primarily
along traditional functional lines.' However, the definition of "bank" has
always been more expansive in Europe than in the United States
("U.S.").3 In general, the EEC's approach to financial regulation has
involved an accommodation rather than a reconciliation of the regulatory

1. The Treaty of Rome created the EEC. A Brief Introduction to European Law,
Directives, 3, available in WESTLAW, CELEX-LEG Database. It is comprised of
twelve member European states. Id. § I.I. A Parliament has been set up comprised of
representatives of all member states. Through consideration of various council and
committee proposals it passes legislation by which the member states consider themselves
bound. Id. § II. Directives are analogous to U.S. statutes as they are legislative acts of
Parliament. Id. The member states then implement, through amendments of their
domestic laws, the legislation of the EEC. Id. Regulations are similar to U.S.
administrative law, but with more force in that they are acts of Parliament. However,
regulations are not passed on by the members' domestic legislators. Id.
2. "Traditional functional lines" here means banking, securities, and insurance
services. However, it should be noted that the definitions of such vary not only between
the United States and Europe, but also among the European countries. See generally T.
HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURTIES REGULATION § 19.5 (2d ed. 1990).
3. The First Directive defines bank as a "credit institution ...

whose business is to

receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own
account". Council Directive 77/780, art. 1, 1977 O.J. (L 322) 30, 32 [hereinafter First
Directive]. Although this definition is similar to the American law (see 12 U.S.C. § 214
(1994)), the Second Directive was more expansive, and included activities not typical of
American banking operations. Council Directive 89/646, annex 1, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1,
18 [hereinafter Second Directive].
The term "bank" will be used interchangeably with "credit institution." However,
it should be noted that outside of the U.S., the term "bank" generally encompasses many
of the activities that are also conducted by U.S. securities broker-dealers and investment
banks. See discussion infra at part II.C. 1.

455

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 16

schemes of the different European countries. 4 The EEC's recently enacted
Second Banking Directive ("Second Directive") 5 and Investment Services
Directive ("ISD") 6 reflect both these tendencies.
As a result of these directives, there may well be a greater
consolidation of European financial institutions which could result in more
financial conglomerates.' The Second Directive and ISD emphasize the
protection of the institution against insolvency by the usual capital
adequacy mechanisms of assigning various market and credit risk factors
to proprietary businesses along product lines.' Yet, U.S. regulation
continues the traditional separation of banking and securities activities. 9
Consequently, this disparity will create both opportunities and hazards for
U.S. financial institutions operating in the EEC.
This paper first compares the EEC directives and relevant U.S.
banking and securities regulations governing foreign operations. The
analysis signals opportunities for "regulatory arbitrage," as well as

4. "The single banking license will be mutually recognized by all Community
supervisory authorities. This recognition will however be subject to the provision that
banks only undertake those banking activities in other member states, which the authorities
in the home country allow them to undertake domestically .... " EUROPEAN UPDATE,
Banking and Financial Services, § 3.31 (June 9, 1993) (Main Text) available in
WESTLAW, EURUPDATE Database, 1991 WL 11696 [hereinafter EUROPEAN UPDATE].

5. Second Directive, supra note 3.
6. Investment Services Directive, Council Directive 93/22, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 27
[hereinafter ISD].
7. Kazuhiko Koguchi, FinancialConglomerates:How Big is Beautiful; Finance,OECD
OBSERVER, Aug. 1993, at 18.
8. Capital Adequacy Directive, Council Directive 93/6, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 1
[hereinafter CAD]; ISD, supra note 6. There are various forms of financial regulatory
mechanisms; for a more detailed comparison of theses methods as employed in the United
States, see Gary Haberman, CapitalRequirements of Commercial and Investment Banks:
Contrastsin Regulation, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. Q. REV., Autumn 1987, at 1, 8.
Capital adequacy ratio is a method whereby the assets of financial services firms are
assigned percentage weightings that increase with market illiquidity or credit risk. The
resulting ratio is a function of the illiquid assets divided by a base capital figure, which
is generally equal to equity capital plus certain subordinated debt. Another common
method of capital measurement is the Net Capital Ratio. This ratio is generally calculated
by applying market or credit risk factors to all categories of assets and deducting this sum
from a base capital figure, which is analogous to that of capital adequacy. This adjusted
capital amount is then divided by a liquid asset figure, usually customer receivables. Id.
9. This note does not deal with insurance regulation, which may also be considered a
"financial service." See, e.g., USA: U.S. Law Extends its Claws into European
Insurance/BankingAlliances, Reuter Textline, July 16, 1991, availablein LEXIS, World
Library, ALLWLD File.
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inconsistencies between U.S. and EEC regulation that require careful
planning. Finally, amendments to the U.S. banking and securities rules
are reviewed to indicate the direction the lawmakers are taking with
respect to increasing foreign competition and the continued opposition to
liberalization of regulation of the U.S. securities industry.

II. THE STATUTORY

FRAMEWORK OF THE

EEC AND U.S. RULES

A. EEC Regulation of Banks and Investment Firms:
The FinancialServices Directives
Similar to U.S. capital rules, the Second Directive and the ISD
emphasize the protection of the firm against insolvency by the usual capital
adequacy mechanisms of assigning various market and credit risk factors
to proprietary businesses along product lines."0
However, the EEC's approach to financial regulation is an
accommodation rather than a reconciliation of the regulatory schemes of
the different European countries." For example, rather than dictating
which activities are banking and which are not, the Second Directive
provides a list of activities "subject to mutual recognition" by the other
members of the EEC. 2
The Second Directive, issued in 1989, calls for a uniform license
arrangement among the twelve members of the EEC.' 3 The purpose of
both the treaty and the directive is to provide for overall supervision of
credit institutions within the EEC by the home regulator, while
coordinating such with the host country regulators. " This principle has
carried through to the ISD. " Credit institution is defined by reference to
the definition contained in Article I of the First Banking Directive.' 6
10. CAD, supra note 8.
11. EU OPEAN UPDATE, supra note 4, § 3.31.
12. Second Directive, supra note 3, annex.
13. Second Directive, supra note 3, pmbl. The uniform license would provide for the
home country to issue a license to the financial institution that would be valid throughout
all member states. Id.
14. "Home" refers to the member country in which the financial institution is
chartered; "host" refers to the member country wherein the financial institution will
operate as a subsidiary, affiliate, branch or agency. See Nancy Louise Kessler, Banking
on Europe: 1992 and EMU, 60 FoRDHAM L. REv. S395, S400-402 (1992).
15. ISD, supra note 6, art. 3.
16. First Directive, supra note 3, art. 1.
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Therein, a credit institution is defined simply as a "means or undertaking
whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the
public and to grant credits for its own account." 17 The Second Directive
carries over this definition and adds to it a list of other activities, discussed
below, to be mutually agreed upon."8 An investment services firm is any
firm that does not receive deposits, grants credits, and carries on at least
one of the activities listed in Section A of the annex to the ISD.19 All of
the activities listed in Section A are also included in the annex to the
Second Directive as acceptable activities for credit institutions to engage
in.2" Therefore, a credit institution can also be an investment services
firm, but the latter cannot be a credit institution unless it receives deposits
and grants credits.
Because the member states each have varying definitions of a
"bank," 2 ' the directives also seek to create conditions for reciprocity
among the various financial institutions by listing the more common
activities of credit institutions and investment services firms that are
subject to mutual recognition.22 Although the Directives anticipate that the
individual countries will amend their own statutes to conform to the
directives, 23 host countries may impose stricter or different requirements
on foreign firms, provided the domestic firms are subject to identical
regulation.24 The home country is the primary regulator and is the one
which grants the license.2" Ideally, as stated in the preamble to the
banking directives, this scheme depends upon cooperation and coordination
between the members' regulators.26
17. Id. Although this definition is similar to U.S. law (compare 12 U.S.C. § 214
(1994)), the Second Directive, while keeping the base definition, included activities not
typical of U.S. banking operations.
18. Second Directive, supra note 3, annex.
19. ISD, supra note 6, annex.
20. Second Directive, supra note 3, annex.
21. See generally Michael Gruson, Non-Banking Activities of ForeignBanks Operating
in the United States, in REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKs § 9.01 (Michael Gruson &
Ralph Reisner eds., 1991).
22. Second Directive, supra note 3, art. 1, annex 1; ISD, supra note 4, arts. 1 & 2
and annex.
23. A Brief Introduction to European Law, supra note 1.
24. Second Directive, supra note 3, arts. 13, 14 & 15. See also FinancialServices:
Top U.S. FinancierAttacks Lack of Specificity in ISD, EuJoWATCH, May 31, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Europe Library, EURWCH File.
25. Second Directive, supra note 3, art. 20.
26. First Directive, supra note 3; Second Directive, supra note 3.
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The Second Directive lists activities that the single license governs. 27
The license covers acceptance of deposits, lending, issuing and
administering means of payment (e.g., credit cards, drafts, checks, etc.),
financial leasing, and guarantees or commitments. 28 However, and more
important to certain countries, the Second Directive would also include
securities business activities such as proprietary trading, agency trading for
customers, participation in share issuances, portfolio management and
advice, and safekeeping and administration of securities. 29 Banks may also
become stock exchange members. 3" Significantly, the Second Directive
now confirms that the license, once issued, is valid throughout any and all
member states of the EEC to provide the aforementioned services. 3
In addition, there is provision for reciprocity for non-EEC banks to
obtain a license.32 If a non-EEC country does not permit similar
competitive advantages to the EEC member bank or investment firm in its
country, the non-EEC financial institution may be denied a license for a
particular EEC country.33 At present, there is provision for the
grandfathering of non-EEC financial institutions that are already
established in the individual countries.34
B. U.S. Regulation of U.S. Banks and Brokers in the EEC
Banking Regulation

1.

U.S. commercial banking is usually defined as the taking of customer
deposits and, in turn, lending them out to commercial entities or
individuals in the form of short-term or long-term loans and mortgages. 35
This circumscription of activities arises from the collective effect of

27. Second Directive, supra note 3, annex 1.

28. Id. annex ("List of Activities Subject to Mutual Recognition").
29. Id.
30.
(Sept.
31.
32.

COOPERS & LYBRAND, EC COMMENTARIES: BANKING AND SECURrIES § 14.8
9, 1993), available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, EURSCP File.
Second Directive, supra note 3, art. 18.
Id. art. 9.

33. Id. However, as one commentator has noted, "[The term] 'reciprocity' has been
changed to 'relations with third countries,' signaling that retaliation is not the main
objective." Udo-Olaf Bader, Regulation by the European Communities, in REGULATON
OF FOREIGN BANKS, supra note 21, § 11.04.A.1.
34. COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 30, § 3.5.
35. Franklin Nat'l Bank v. N.Y., 347 U.S. 373 (1954).
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several legislative acts.
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 ("BHCA"), as amended,
essentially prohibits bank holding companies from owning more than five
percent of the shares of a company that is not a bank.36 Under U.S.
banking laws, nonbanks include investment banks, 3 securities brokerdealers, and industrial concerns. In addition, the Edge Act does not
permit foreign branches of U.S. banks to "engage or participate, directly
or indirectly, in the business of underwriting, selling, or distributing of
securities. "38 Similarly, under the Edge Act and the BHCA, foreign
branches of U.S. securities broker-dealers would be precluded from
banking activities abroad without becoming subject to the BHCA.3 9
Finally, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991 ("the Improvement Act") limits U.S. banking activities abroad by
prohibiting FDIC insurance of deposits outside the U.S. 40
However, Federal Reserve Board ("Board") Regulation K has been
relaxed to expand the scope of permitted banking activities abroad.41
Although the Glass-Steagall Act, by its terms, does not control banking
activities outside of the United States,42 the BHCA has been interpreted to
apply to such activities while at the same time creating exemptions to
conduct "nonbanking" activities with either regulation or Board approval.43
The Board has been allowed to interpret its Congressional authority
broadly. For example, the Board is permitted to authorize those activities
that it defines to be "usual" in connection with the transaction of banking
or other financial operations. 44 The Board has determined that "usual"
includes the following: underwriting, distributing, and dealing in equity
and debt securities outside of the United States (with certain limitations on
36. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(a)(1)-(7) (1994).
37. For an extensive analysis of the differences between investment and commercial
banking and the development of the investment banking business, see United States v.
Morgan, 118 F.Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
38. Edge Act, 12 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1994).

39. Id.; Bank Holding Company Act § 1843.
40. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
41. International Banking Operations, 12 C.F.R. § 211 (1993) (Regulation K); see also
Nonbanking Activities and Acquisitions by Bank Holding Companies, 12 C.F.R. § 225

(1993) ( Regulation Y).
42. National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 202 (1994).

43. Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207
(1984).

44. Id. at 217.
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equity securities); organizing, sponsoring, and managing mutual funds;
acquiring up to 100% of a foreign government or governmental agency
corporation's stock or up to 40 % of foreign private corporations; merchant
banking; acting as Futures Commissions Merchant and, by incorporation
of Regulation Y, permitting securities and commodities brokering by the
foreign affiliate.4" Banking activities include "commercial and other
banking activities, financing, leasing, underwriting credit life insurance
and credit accident and health insurance, underwriting, distributing and
dealing in debt securities outside the United States, and limited equity
underwriting." 46 Regulation Y provides a "[l]ist of permissible nonbanking activities" that are "so closely related to banking

. . .

that they

may be engaged in by a bank holding company or a subsidiary thereof
... "" Among the most important allowable Regulation Y activities are
securities brokerage operations, but they are limited to agency transactions
The
for customers and restricted investment banking business.4"
exemption for these activities is now generally limited by capital utilization
and total equity. 49
2.

Securities Broker-Dealer Regulation

"[The SEC] uses an entity approach with respect to registered brokerdealers. Under this approach, if a foreign broker-dealer physically operates
a branch in the United States and thus becomes subject to U.S. registration
requirements, the registration requirements and the regulatory system
governing U.S. broker-dealers would apply to the entire foreign brokerdealer entity." 50 SEC Rule 15a-6, promulgated in 1989, permits
exemptions for registration of foreign broker-dealers who operate in
foreign countries and who have limited contacts with U.S. citizens, and

45. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
46. Regulation K § 211.5(d).
47. Regulation Y § 225.25(a).
48. Id. § 225.25(b)(15)(i).
49. The amended Regulation K now permits U.S. banks to engage in limited
underwriting and securities activities abroad limited to "25 % of the investors' tier 1 capital
[where the investor is a Bank Holding Company]" or 100% of the same for all other

investors. Regulation K § 211.5(b).
50. Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No.
21,017, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,013, 30,016 n.43 (July 11, 1989) [hereinafter Release 15a-6].
Recently enacted SEC Rule 15a-6 expands the Commission's jurisdiction over foreign

activities by requiring registration with the SEC in given circumstances.
240.15a-6 (1993).

17 C.F.R. §
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U.S. registrants or U.S. securities as regulated under the Securities Act of
1933 ("SA"). 51 This regulation covers foreign broker-dealer affiliates of
U.S. broker-dealers as well. As one commentator aptly noted, "Rule 15a6 is the SEC's effort to fill a regulatory void, . . .[while] Regulation K

is the Board's interpretation and amplification of U.S. banking law. "52
The rule requires regulation of the foreign broker unless the broker
falls within one of the rule's exemptive provisions.53 If the foreign
broker-dealer does not fall within the exemptions permitted, the broker
will become subject to all the financial and operational requirements of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"). 4 "[S]ection 30(b) of the
Exchange Act [excludes] from the application of the [1934 Act] 'any
person transact[ing] a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the
United States,' in the absence of Commission rules explicitly applying
those provisions to these persons. " 5 However, the SEC's position on
30(b) has been and continues to be that "the phrase 'without the
jurisdiction of the United States' in that section does not refer to the
territorial limits of the [the United States]."56 Furthermore, if the foreign
country's laws prohibit or inhibit the SEC from obtaining information to
ensure initial or continued compliance with exemptions, the SEC can
withdraw its exemption. 57
The exemption is unconditional for foreign broker-dealers that effect
unsolicited transactions in securities5" and, to a limited extent, for those
broker-dealers who provide research reports to U.S. institutional investors,
provided the research reports do not recommend the use of the foreign
broker-dealers to effect the trades in any security and do not otherwise
attempt to induce the use of the foreign broker-dealers's services by the
U.S. institutions.

However, the more onerous exemptive provisions lie in subsection

51. Id.
52. Joel P. Trachtman, Recent Initiatives in InternationalFinancial Regulation and
Goals of Competitiveness, Effectiveness and Cooperation, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 241,
275 (1991).
53. SEC Rule 15a-6(a).
54. SEC Rule 15a-6.
55. Release 15a-6, supra note 50, at 30,016 (quoting 17 U.S.C. 78dd(b)).
56. Id.
57. SEC Rule 15a-6(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6(c).
58. Id.(a)(1).

59. Id.(a)(2).
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(a)(3) of the rule. Here, if the foreign broker-dealer "induces or attempts
to induce the purchase or sale of any security by a U.S. institutional
investor," which is the more likely scenario in a competitive global
market, it must register unless it meets the following safe-harbor tests: (1)
the foreign broker-dealer effects the transaction through a U.S. domestic
broker-dealer; and (2) the investor must be "sophisticated" (have assets
greater than $100 million). 6° At the same time the SEC released Rule 15a6, it issued a "Concept Release," which would provide for recognition of
comparable foreign broker-dealer regulation. The Concept Release would
permit exemption from the first criterion of Rule 15a-6 if (1) the foreign
broker does not have a U.S.-related securities business greater than ten
percent of its total securities revenues and does not have a U.S. brokerdealer affiliate and (2) the foreign country's regulatory scheme must be
comparable to that found in the U.S. 61 This last requirement of course is
rather amorphous. For example, the rule calls for the foreign country's
scheme to provide for (1) a net capital rule; (2) recordkeeping rules; (3)
custody or safekeeping of customer's assets; and (4) the SEC to examine
"the status of customers' funds and securities [if] the foreign broker-dealer
is adjudicated bankrupt. 62
C. Summary of Significant Differences in the U.S. and EEC Rules
There are three U.S. financial regulatory schemes in place that will
present either competitive advantages or disadvantages to U.S. affiliates
doing business in the EEC. The first is the separation of commercial and
investment banking. 63 The second is the limitation on ownership or
control of non-banking affiliates by a bank or bank holding company.'
Finally, there is the "reserve requirement" imposed by the SEC on
customer assets held by securities broker-dealers. 65
Significantly, although these three areas may represent potential for
opportunity or conflict, these activities and requirements are encompassed
by both U.S. and EEC rules. The issue then becomes the extent to which

60. Id. (a)(3)(iii).
61. Recognition of Foreign Broker-Dealer Regulation, Exchange Act Release No.
27,018, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,087 (July 11, 1989) [hereinafter Concept Release].
62. SEC Rule 15a-6(a)(3)(iii).
63. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 184 (1933), codified in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C. (usually referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act).
64. Bank Holding Company Act.
65. SEC Rule 15c3-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (1993).
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they are permitted or required under the U.S. rules. There are no
absolute limits imposed by EEC rules, only mutual recognition. For
example, the list of activities under Annex 1 to the Second Directive is
quite similar to the list of "permissible" investments and non-banking
activities under Regulations K and Y.6 In addition, the record keeping
and retention rules, sales practices rules, and protection of customer asset
rules of the ISD are very similar to the SEC rules. 67 But, as noted earlier,
the similarity ends there. It is the degree to which the respective entities
may engage in the various activities and the extent to which customer
assets must be safeguarded that distinguishes U.S. and EEC regulation.
The opportunities for regulatory arbitrage lie therein.
Separation of Investment and Commercial Banking

1.

The separation of investment and commercial banking 68 is not
common worldwide. 69 Apart from Japan, which recently amended its laws
to approach those of the EEC, 70 only the U.S. has almost complete
institutional separation of these two activities. The most recent attempt to
dismantle the separation failed with passage of the Improvement Act.7"
Generally, there are three stated reasons for the separation. First,
underwriting securities is inherently risky and could result in systemic
failure of the financial institutions if a large commercial bank failed as a
result of a market collapse on a day the bank was holding an underwriting
position. Second, the 1929 stock market crash and subsequent Depression
were caused by the combination of securities broker-dealers and banks in
that business. Third, commercial lending is the backbone of the economy
66. Compare supra notes 24 and 41 and accompanying text to notes 54 and 56 and
accompanying text.
67. Compare articles 8 through 15 and 20 of the ISD, supra note 4, to SEC rules
under §§ 15 and 17 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(o) and
(q) (1994).
68. Commercial banking is usually defined as the taking of customer deposits and in

turn lending to commercial entities or individuals in the form of credit cards, short-term
or long-term loans, and mortgages, whereas investment banking generally involves
purchasing a commercial entity's public stock or debt upon initial issuance and then
distributing it to the public through a securities exchange.
supra note 8.

See generally Haberman,

69. Mark Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the
United States, 120 YALE L.J. 1927, 1948-1955 (1993); Gunther Broker, Competition in
Banking, 160 OECD OBSERVER 34 (1989); but c.f. Glass-Steagall Act.

70. Koguchi, supra note 7.
71. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
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and investors and savers must not lose confidence in the banking system
as a result of it being tainted by risky non-banking business.72 In contrast,
most EEC countries permit both banks and nonbanks to carry out
investment banking, securities dealing, and brokerage.73 Moreover, Japan
has recently lowered its Glass-Steagall type barriers and now permits
securities brokerage and dealing activities by banks and vice versa.74
Unlike the EEC directives, U.S. securities and banking laws generally
prohibit any securities brokerage activities by a bank unless it is effected
by a "§ 20 affiliate" or its trust department. 75 The exemption is limited
to national banks and applies only to agency trading for customers.76
Some barriers to underwriting have recently been lifted through the
easement of the Federal Reserve Board regulations or by order, and
affirmed by Supreme Court decisions as not violative of the BHCA or
Glass-Steagall Act.77 Recently, as a combined result of the Bank of Credit

and Commerce International ("BCCI") and U.S. commercial and savings
banks failures, there has been a backlash of regulation by Congress that
affects both domestic banking and foreign banks wishing to do business in
the U.S., as the legislative history to the Improvement Act attests. 78 This
reaction has elicited warnings from EEC President Brittan that imply that
these rules are too protectionist and not congruent with the EEC
directives. 71
72. Edward I. O'Brien, FinancialDeregulation:The Securities Industry Perspective,
31 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 271 (1986).
73. Nancy Worth, Harmonizing CapitalAdequacy Rules for InternationalBanks and
Securities Firms, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 133, 152-3 (1992) (listing the

following countries: Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Fratice, Portugal, Spain, and the U.K.).
74. Koguchi, supra note 7.
75. Under § 15(a) of the of 1934 Act, any broker or dealer in securities is required
to register with the SEC as such. 15 U.S.C. § 78(o) (1994). Under the Banking Act of
1933, banks cannot underwrite or distribute securities. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 16, 29, 21 and
32 (1994). Furthermore, securities brokers appear to be precluded from accepting

commercial deposits under various sections of the National Banking Act and the Federal
Reserve Act. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 221, 377 and 378(a) (1994).

76. See Regulation Y.
77. National banks, now within limits, are now permitted to underwrite corporate debt
and equity securities. Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,

468 U.S. 27 (1984); Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp.,
474 U.S. 361 (1986); Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
829 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988).
78. H.R. REP. No. 330, 102nd Cong., 1st sess. 88 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1901.

79. EEC/U.S.: Brittan Warns of Threat to EuropeanBanks from U.S. Refonns, EuR.
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2. The Universal Bank and Ownership or Control of or by Non-Banking
Affiliates
In contrast to U.S. regulation is the concept of the universal bank."0
The universal bank permits industrial, banking, and securities activities to
take place in one entity.8 ' Moreover, universal banks may own or be
owned by a controlling interest in a commercial or industrial concern, for
instance as an automobile manufacturer. 8 2 These financial "supermarkets"
are common in three EEC countries: Austria, Germany, and Switzerland.83
Recent statistics have shown that over ten percent of commercial
equity is controlled by universal banks in Germany. 8" The amount owned
by these banks has steadily increased over the past decade and in many
cases represents controlling interests in these commercial entities."
Under German law (a proxy for universal bank law), a bank will not
incur any excess capital charges on its loans to any one issuer unless the
issuer owns (or controls) greater than 25% of the bank's stock (or its
board of directors).86 There apparently is no limit on deductions for such
loans, provided the bank can maintain minimum capital requirements.
Moreover, a German bank will not incur excess capital charges on its loan
portfolio, unless a particular issuer's loans exceed 15% of a bank's
regulatory capital. 87 No single loan may exceed 50% of such capital, and

all such loans in the aggregate can not exceed eight times regulatory
capital. 8 8 This limit is absolute.
Under the Second Directive, banks are limited to equity holdings of
nonfinancial institutions of up to 15% of their capital for a single entity,
REP., May 4, 1991, § 5 at 5 [hereinafter Brittan] (EEC's reaction to the BCCI scandal);
see also Ministers Extend Bank Supervision Rules; Decision Influenced by Collapse of
BCCI, EuRoWATCH, Apr. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, EURWCH
File.
80. "[Universal banks] offer the full range of banking services . . [t]here is no
equivalent to the Glass-Steagall Act in ... Germany. German law ... do[es] not
differentiate between commercial banks and investment banks." Ekkard Bauer, Regulation
in Germany, in REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS, supra note 21, § 13.07.
81. Id.
82. Roe, supra note 69, at 1949.
83. Worth, supra note 73, at 136.

84. Id. at n.95.
85. Id. at 1949.
86. Bauer, supra note 80, § 13.14.
87. Id. § 13.16.
88. Id.
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and up to 60% of their capital for all such holdings.89 Member states
may permit these thresholds to be exceeded if the bank deducts the excess
amounts from capital. Similar to the German law, the Second Directive
calls for increased capital charges and limits on concentrated loan
positions.' Under the Second Directive, large exposures are considered
to be those loan values that are equal to or greater than 15% of the bank's
capital. 9 ' Also similar to German law, these items are reportable to the
banking supervisor. Under the Second Directive, banks are generally
prohibited from holding concentrated positions that exceed 40% of capital
and all such positions that would exceed eight times capital.92 This limit,
like the German one, is absolute.
In contrast, under the I3HCA of 1956 as amended, merger and
conglomerate activities of U.S. banks are severely restricted. The BHCA
prohibits the ownership or control of greater than 5% of a bank by nonbank companies. 93 Importantly, the Board has extended the BHCA
prohibition on ownership of the shares of a nonbanking company to
banks.9 a The Board justifies this by arguing that not to do so would
circumvent the intent of the BHCA, as bank holding companies
beneficially own the shares of its bank subsidiaries. 95 There are exceptions
to this prohibition for non-bank subsidiaries that are "so closely related to
banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident
thereto." 9 6 The exceptions and limitations to the ownership rules are
enumerated in various sections of Regulation Y. 97 Similar to the German
and EEC law, there are concentration charges for large loans and
98
exposures to any one issuer when calculating the minimum capital ratios.
However, the BHCA 5% limitation on share ownership is not similar to
German and EEC law. As a result, the Board has permitted, by regulation,
banks to acquire up to 40% of foreign private corporation stock if the
V.S. bank is doing business abroad. 99 The regulation is very complex.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

EUROPEAN UPDATE, supra note 4,

§ 3.3.7.

Id. § 4.3.4.
Id. § 4.3.4.2.
Id. § 4.3.4.3.
Bank Holding Company Act § 1843(a).
Id. § 225.101.
Id.
Id. § 1843(c)(8).
Regulation Y §§ 225.21, 225.25.
Regulation K § 211.5.
Id. § 211.5(a).
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Investments for purposes of the rule must be made through joint-ventures
and are subject to revenue and (or) equity limitations as a function of the
Finally, as
type of business the investing organization is engaged."
prevent the
regulations
related
and
Act
discussed earlier, the Glass-Steagall
ownership or control of greater than 5% of a bank or bank holding
company by a non-bank.' 0 ' There is no such limitation under the EEC
directives nor under German law.
3.

Use of Customer Assets

Although it is rarely addressed, another significant distinction between
U.S. bank and securities regulation is the segregation and reserve of
customer assets. " 2 Securities broker-dealers, not by statute but by
administrative regulation through SEC Rule 15c3-3, must bifurcate their
balance sheets and securities holdings into firm and customer property. 0 a
Through an elaborate regulatory scheme, broker-dealers are, in reality,
custodians for fully-paid-for or excess customer margin securities and
customer deposits. Securities firms may only use customer funds or
securities to the extent necessary to meet margin requirements or
This phobia of holding
collateralized financing needs of customers."
Stock Exchange rule,
York
a
New
by
is
exemplified
deposits
customer
payment of interest
the
exceptions,
which prohibits, with certain limited
5
This rule is neither
on idle customer funds at brokerage houses."
required by any securities legislation nor enforced by the SEC. "6 Finally,
100. Id.
101. See discussion infra part II.C.1.
102. Under SEC Rule 15c 3 -3 , broker-dealers must segregate net customer assets and

otherwise not employ any customer assets in proprietary business. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c33 (1993). Section 15(c)(3) of the 1934 Act comes the closest to requiring segregation, and
certainly does not seem to mandate 100% reserves against net customer assets. "Such
rules and regulations shall (A) require the maintenance of reserves with respect to
customer deposits or credit balances .... ." 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1994). Similarly, the
SIPA Congress defers to the above and simply states, "The Commission [is] to promulgate
rules with respect to. . . the carrying and use of customer deposits or credit balances."
H.R. REP. No. 1613, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5254.
103. Rule 15c3-3(a)(1) and Exhibit A.

104. Id. Exhibit A; 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-1 (1993).
105. Regulation of Broker-Dealers: Interest-Bearing Free Credit Balances, Exchange
Act Release No. 18,262, 46 Fed. Reg. 58,236 (Nov. 30, 1981).

106. Id. at 58,236 n.4. However, the SEC has also noted that balances retained at
broker-dealers for the sole purpose of earning interest are not protected by SIPC. Id. at
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to the extent that the assets of a customer of a broker-dealer (funds and
securities together) exceed, in the aggregate, amounts owed primarily for
margin transactions to the broker-dealer by all other customers, the excess
must be deposited at a bank in a custodian account, either in cash or in
government securities.'0 7 The computation to determine this "reserve
deposit" is performed weekly for most broker-dealers.108 However, the
amount must be segregated for the entire week. Funds cannot be
withdrawn without an additional computation of the requirement. And per
the rule, the broker-dealer is expected to be in compliance with this
calculation daily. 109 It is interesting to compare this rule to the
requirements of banks. U.S. banks were subject to similar regulations
which required that at the end of each day a relatively small percentage of
customer deposit money had to be "reserved."'
This was accomplished simply by a bookkeeping entry and was more in
the nature of a capital requirement than a custodial function."' The
requirement has more to do with Board 2monetary policy and systemic
funding needs than customer protection. "
III. OPPORTUNITIES AND CONCERNS CREATED BY THE DIFFERENCES

A. Introduction
For purposes of the following discussion, "regulatory arbitrage" is
defined as varying economic efficiencies for identical financial transactions
resulting from differing regulations over such transactions. The dissimilar
regulatory effects in the same market are the result of institutions or

58,236-37.
107. SEC Rule 15c3-3(e).
108. Id.
109. SEC Rule 15c3-3(g).
110. The Federal Reserve Act provides for reserves against customer deposits between
three and nine percent. 12 U.S.C. § 461(b) (1994). This requiremetit is no longer the

major regulatory tool, since it was essentially replaced with the Basle Accord Capital
Adequacy Ratio framework in 1989.12 C.F.R. §§ 208.1-. 127, §§ 160-88 (1991). See also
Camille M. Caesar, Note, Capital-BasedRegulationand U.S. Banking Reform, 101 YALE
L.J. 1525, 1526 nn.7 & 8 (1992).

111. The reserve required banks to leave funds at the regional federal reserve banks,
interest free. This practice has changed somewhat in that the Federal Reserve now pays
a discount rate. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 65 (7th ed. 1984).
112. Id. at 68-71.
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products being subjected to different regulatory schemes. Regulatory
arbitrage may result by effecting cross-border transactions. 113 The present
U.S. and European regulatory scheme invites regulatory arbitrage as was
made painfully obvious by the recent collapse of BCCI. Financial
institutions, and in particular banks, are no longer territorial in nature. As
one author14has noted, "[B]anking has become international; supervising it
has not."

1

The Second Directive and the ISD embody many of the U.S.
requirements." 5 For example, the requirement of segregation of customer
assets is actually more stringent in the ISD because it has the force of
legislation and is not simply a regulation." 6 Also, the directives call for
consolidated supervision and mandatory compensation schemes.'17
However, these requirements are not present in most countries."' In
fact, only the UK has a customer segregation rule,"I9 and many European
countries have only piecemeal compensation schemes.' 20 In the U.S., the
Market Reform Act of 1990 requires holding companies and certain other
affiliates (both foreign and domestic) of broker-dealers to file quarterly
information with the SEC.12' This is probably the first step toward
consolidated or holding company regulation. Of course, U.S. banks have
been subject to holding company regulation since the enactment of the
22
BHCA. 1

113. Manning G. Warren, GlobalHarmonizationof SecuritiesLaws: The Achievements
of the European Communities, 31 HARv. INT'L L.J. 185, 188 (1990). See also Keith R.
Fisher, Reweaving the Safety Net: Bank Diversification into Securities and Insurance
Activities, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 123, 138 n.66 (1992) ("This potential for regulatory
arbitrage is expected to cause laws and regulations throughout the member states to

converge toward the list of permissible activities contained in the Annex").
114. Barbara C. Matthews, The Second Banking Directive: Conflicts, Choices, and

Long-Term Goals, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 89, 127 n.4 (1992). See also id. at 127
n.7 and accompanying text.
115. ISD, supra note 6, pmbl., arts. 1-17.
116. Id. art. 10.
117. FinancialServices, Commission ProposesBanking Rules to Broaden Supervisory

Authority, EUROWATCH, Nov. 27, 1992, availablein LEXIS, Europe Library, EURWCH
File.
118. See generally THE SPICER & OPPENHEIM GUIDE TO
AROUND THE WORLD (Peter J. Oliver & Joel Press eds., 1988).

119. Id. at 216.
120. Id. at 238-41.

121. 15 U.S.C. § 78(q) (1994).
122. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1994).

SECURITIES MARKETS
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B. Regulatory Arbitrage Involving U.S. Rules
Present domestic and foreign regulatory schemes may give some
competitive advantage to a U.S. Bank doing business in a foreign country.
This is also true of those U.S. banks that conduct institutional business
under Regulation K. At present, the regulatory arbitrage that the SEC was
attempting to prevent by the issuance of Rule 15a-6 may be taking place.123
Ironically, arbitrage is augmented, domestically, not by the pending EEC
regulation, but by the actions of U.S. regulators who may24 not have
coordinated domestic rules regulating similar activity abroad.
Although it is clear that the SEC has jurisdiction over securities
activities of U.S. banks, it is not at all apparent that it has the authority to
regulate the foreign subsidiaries or branches of U.S. banks that are
operating pursuant to the Regulation K criteria. 25 U.S. securities dealers
may have foreign banking operations under holding company affiliates,
provided the activities are not violative of SEC Rule 15a-6 and Regulation
K. 12 6 However, there may be a gap in the regulations that permits
Regulation K foreign banking affiliates to conduct their securities
brokerage27businesses with an advantage over a Rule 15a-6 securities dealer
affiliate. 1
Reading certain sections of Regulations K and Y together 2 ' suggests
a U.S. banking affiliate in a foreign country may be permitted to function
as a dealer, underwriter, and agent for securities brokerage business all
under the same roof within the bank, which would be almost identical to
an EEC institution. 29 Although the underwriting and dealing activities are

123. Regulatory arbitrage can be further defined as gaining economic advantage
through reduced utilization of capital or other resources when effecting an identical
transaction either in a different market or through entities that are regulated differently.
This is solely because there are a different set of rules pertaining to such transaction
simply as a result of the jurisdiction of the various regulators. See generally Worth, supra
note 73, at 142-6.
124. Id. at 143 n.55 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
127. The apparent scope of Rule 15a-6 is limited to "foreign entities engaged in certain
activities involving U.S. investors and securities markets." Release 15a-6, supra note 50,
at 30,013. Consequently, it would not reach purely foreign securities activities. Id.
However, Regulation K apparently has no such explicit constraints: it simply states,
§ 211.5(a).
"Activities abroad, whether conducted directly or indirectly ....

128. § 225.25(b)(15); § 211.5(d)(14), (19) and (20).
129. Regulations Y and K do not require that these businesses be conducted in separate
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limited by regulation, permitting these activities in this form is the first
substantial step toward giving U.S. banks a competitive edge over both
U.S. securities dealers and foreign investment services firms doing
business in the EEC. This conclusion depends on the reach of Rule 15a-6,
which is not yet clear. Would the U.S. foreign banking entity be exempt
from Rule 15a-6, if it did not effect its U.S. related transactions through
a U.S. broker-dealer? In response to this question, the SEC would
probably argue the following:
Section 3(a)(4) of the Exchange Act defines "broker" as "any person
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the
account of others, but does not include a bank." 30 The term "bank,"
however, is limited by section 3(a)(6) of the Exchange Act131 to banks
subject to U.S. state or federal bank regulation. Thus, foreign banks that
act as brokers or dealers within the jurisdiction of the United States are
subject to U.S. broker-dealer registration requirements.1 32 Moreover,
Regulation K exemptions do not speak to "required comparable foreign
regulation" for permitting exemption of the various activities otherwise not
allowed in the U.S. Tts, under the Concept133Release, these activities
would arguably be subject to SEC jurisdiction.
Several factors militate against SEC jurisdiction. First, it would
undercut the purpose of Regulation K. Regulation K was promulgated to
enable U.S. banks to compete with foreign financial conglomerates, which
are viewed as having a competitive advantage because of their more
permissive regulations in regard to securities activities. 31 It would be
ironic indeed, that such an attempt at broader worldwide competition
would be thwarted by an SEC regulation working to close a "regulatory
gap. "
Furthermore, the SEC's jurisdictional basis to promulgate Rule 15a-6
stands on weak ground and has not yet been directly tested in the couarts., 35
Whenever the SEC asserts jurisdiction over transactions outside the
territory of the U.S., lower courts have relied on the "effects" or

entities. Regulation Y § 225.25; Regulation K § 211.5. The Bank Holding Company Act,
the Glass-Steagall Act, and the Edge Act generally defer to the Board's rule making
authority with regard to international operations. See Trachtman, supra note 52, at 257.

130. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4).
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. § 78c(a)(6)
Release 15a-6, supra note 50, at 30,014 n.16.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
Trachtman, supra note 52, at 256-57.
Id. at 276-79.
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"conduct" tests to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction is
permitted under § 30(b). 36 The tests ask (1) whether domestic investors
or markets are substantially affected or (2) whether the nature of the
conduct within the U.S. permits the U.S. to be used as a base for
manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, including when they
are peddled only to foreigners. 37 The SEC generally relies on the first
test for jurisdiction abroad,131 while most lower courts follow these39 tests
or a similar analysis to apply the securities laws extraterritorially.1
However, recent Supreme Court decisions may have changed the
analysis relied upon for applying any law extraterritorially. The Court
now tends to place more emphasis on explicit statutory language and
Congressional intent to extend jurisdiction abroad. 140 Yet, in a securities
case the Second Circuit has stated, "We freely acknowledge that if we
or even the
were asked to point to language in the [securities] statute,
" 41
legislative history, .

.

. we would be unable to respond.

Finally, we turn to an analysis of the competitive effect on the EEC's
financial institutions. Because the financial regulations are similar, under
the ISD, an investment services firm would probably be exempt under the
Concept Release criteria. 42 However, the EEC credit institution operating
pursuant to the Second Directive and the CAD would presumably have a
similar competitive advantage over the U.S. bank's foreign operations in
the EEC only if the credit institution's combined EEC and U.S. related
trading book business (as defined) did not exceed five percent of its total
business. Once this threshold is exceeded, the CAD requires the credit
institution to operate under the somewhat more restrictive rules of the
ISD. 4 3 Under the Concept Release, the SEC would not require brokerdealer registration unless the total U.S. securities-related revenues
136. Release 15a-6, supra note 50, at 30,015 n.21.
137. Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983).

138. Release 15a-6, supra note 50, at 30,015 n.21.
139. GARY B. BORN & DAvID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CivIL LITIGATION IN UNITED

ed. 1992).
140. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (court searched for
explicit Congressional authorization in applying Title VII extraterritorially to a U.S.
employer). However, in an antitrust suit, which employs analysis very similar to that in
securities cases to obtain jurisdiction, the Court appeared to give deference to precedent
when applying the "conduct or effects" test to London insurers. Hartford Ins. Co. v. Cal.,
509 U.S. 764, 795-96.
141. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975).
142. See discussion infra part III.B.
143. See infra notes 154-158 and accompanying text.
STATES COURTS 640 (2d
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exceeded ten percent of its total of such revenues. This threshold was
devised as an attempt to reconcile the Concept Release with Regulation
K "Qualified Foreign Banking Organization" rules.44
To the extent that an EEC credit institution, otherwise subject to Rule
15a-6, projects that it will remain within the five percent limit, it would
be prudent to form an ISD affiliate to prevent the entire credit institution
from becoming subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC. If the Concept
Release was effective, there would be additional latitude up to ten percent,
as the SEC defines securities activities. In any scenario, it is unclear
whether the SEC would look to consolidated, combined or individual
entities to determine thresholds. Given its "entity" approach to regulation,
it currently is likely that it would only look to each separate institution.
If the EEC institution is conducting the business out of a branch, the SEC
would probably look to combine the branch with the home office for
purposes of the test in the Concept Release. This approach is likely, given
the direction the Congress has taken with the Market Reform Act, wherein
and intercompany transactional risks are more
the consolidated entities
45
scrutinized.
closely
C. Regulatory Arbitrage Under the EEC Rules
The EEC directives all approach trading, dealing, brokering, and
underwriting activity similarly. 46 Generally, there is a capital ratio
approach with net worth and perhaps subordinated debt as the base from
which deductions are made for market and credit risk or illiquid assets. 4 7
Recently, U.S. Banks have conformed to this concept, departing further
from the reserve method. 148
Furthermore, the ISD now calls for
segregation of customer assets as well. 149 This concept was almost unique
to the U.S.."" Finally, the ISD becomes operative on a credit institution,
when the institution's banking license permits securities brokerage,
portfolio
underwriting,
proprietary
trading,
or
discretionary

144. Trachtman, supra note 52, at 280. Discussion of the Board's QFBO rules which
regulate the conduct of foreign banks within the United States is outside the scope of this

However, they also present opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. Id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78(q) (1994).
Worth, supra note 73, at 162-70.
Id. at 140, 147.
Caesar, supra note 110, 1526 & n.8.
ISD, supra note 6, art. 10.
150. See generally THE SPICER & OPPENHEiM GUIDE, supra note 118.

work.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
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management. 151
To compensate for the various discrepancies in each country's GlassSteagall-type laws and capital requirements, the directives provide for
regulation primarily along functional rather than institutional lines.' 2 For
example, proprietary trading by banks will usually be subject to a set of
capital rules different from those of credit institutions, which do not
significantly partake in such activity.' 53 The host regulators may choose
to impose on a credit institution's securities operations, either the Second
Directive's capital rules (the "Solvency Ratio") or the ISD's capital
rules. 54 However, this is not entirely elective. 15 The "election" is only
available to firms whose "trading-book business . . . does not normally
exceed five percent of. . . total business."" ' 6 The Solvency Ratio rules

are generally more liberal in regard to counterparty and position risks," 7
' Foreign
which give advantages in underwriting and proprietary trading. 58
9 Once the
15
ISD.
the
under
treated
currency risk is more conservatively
ISD rules become operative on a credit institution, selected articles of the
ISD also become applicable regardless of the 5% rule.'" For example,
the credit institution would become subject to prudential controls over
customer assets and certain additional reporting requirements.' 6 '
151. ISD, supra note 6, art. 2.
152. CAD, supra note 8. This directive defines "core" activities of banks and
securities firms for purposes of the capital adequacy rules. Id. To the extent that they
overlap, the overlapping activities would be considered "noncore" activities, if the primary
purpose of the institution is to offer the core activities. Therefore, it is not clear whether
the remainder of the firm's activities would be governed by the ISD or the Second
Directive rules as a function of the activities defined in the CAD. See Abrahms, Financial
Services in the New Europe in CoMP. L.Y.B. OF INT'L Bus. 320 (D. Campbell & M.
Moore eds., 1992).
153. CAD, supra note 8.
154. COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 30, § 1.
155. CAD, supra note 8, art. 4 para. 6.
156. Id.
157. Counterparty risk is that risk weight factor generally assigned to a debtor which
is usually a function of the type of debtor (e.g., institutional versus individual, taking
account of credit ratings, etc.) and concentration of holdings (i.e., how large is the asset
in relation to total assets or capital). Position risk is risk weighting assigned to type of
financial instruments (e.g., stocks, bonds, certificates of deposit, etc.) and are usually a
function of market risk (i.e., volatility). See Haberman, supra note 8, at 4.
158. COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 30, § 15.4; CAD, supra note 8, art. 2.
159. Worth, supra note 73, at 152-3.
160. CAD, supra note 8, art. 4 para. 6.
161. ISD, supra note 6, art. 2.
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However, there is a curious exception to the ISD requirement to segregate
customer assets for credit institutions .162 Consequently, a credit institution
conducting an unlimited underwriting and securities brokerage businesses
can apparently use brokerage customer assets to finance these and other
firm activities. 63 This last concept is at variance with U.S. securities laws
and the ISD for investment services firms, as discussed above.
Finally, to avoid further regulatory arbitrage, the percentage
thresholds and definitions of securities activities of the directives and Rule
15a-6 must be brought in line. For example, the EEC's CAD rules ignore
customer agency transactions and arguably underwriting dealer activity
because it only triggers the ISD rules when "trading-book business"
exceeds the five percent threshold.'" Under Rule 15a-6, reference is
always made to securities related activities, which have traditionally
included agency commissions and thus agency transactions, although its
force does not take effect until it exceeded the ten percent threshold. 65
D. The UniversalBank Quagmire
Another opportunity for regulatory arbitrage is the different treatment
afforded universal banks by the EEC, the individual EEC countries, and
the U.S. Both the EEC Second Directive and the U.S. banking laws
permit limited ownership of non-bank affiliates. 166 Because of the
complexity of the Regulation K exception permitting such ownership for
U.S. foreign banking institutions, it is beyond the scope of this Note to
explore the opportunities for regulatory arbitrage in this context.
However, what is clear is that U.S. banks, both home and abroad, may
not be owned by non-bank affiliates. 167 Neither the EEC directives nor
the German law (as a proxy for universal bank law) prohibit such
ownership. However, individual European countries outside of Germany,

162. Id.

163. Id. art. 10.
164. CAD, supra note 8, art. 2 para. 6 (a)-(c). The definition therein of "trading
book" includes "proprietary positions" and exposure to unsettled derivative transactions.

Id. Included in the definition of proprietary positions are issues "held for resale and/or
which are taken on by the institution with the intention of benefiting [from short-term
profits]." Id. If the dealer does not participate in the sydicate, and would thereby only
benefit from commission revenue, dealer activities would arguably not be included in this
definition.
165. SEC Rule 15a-6(b)(3).
166. See discussion infra part II. C. 2.
167. Id.
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68
Austria, and Switzerland have limitations on such ownership.
Therefore, universal banking increases the likelihood of favored loan terms
to nonbank affiliates such as industrial concerns and investment services
firms. This results in regulatory arbitrage in the sense that those banks
not permitted to be owned by nonbank affiliates probably would be shut
off from1 69competing to make loans to the parent or other nonbank
affiliates.
However, this perceived disequilibrium may not present as much
opportunity as first suspected. For example, a universal bank subsidiary
doing business in a nonuniversal bank country under an EEC license may
already be lending to its parent's affiliate; or it could lend to its parent in
the universal bank home country and the parent could in turn redirect it
to the foreign affiliate. This scenario overlooks any other host country
regulations that may prohibit or restrict this activity for prudential
reasons. 7 ° Because the effects are not as obvious as the ones discussed
above, this is an area that probably requires more study to determine the
impact, if any, of the EEC Second Directive now permitting universal
banking in countries where it never before existed.

IV. THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO REFORM

A. Introduction
Most regulations abroad call for reciprocity.'' Unlike the U.S. rules,
the EEC directives focus on reciprocity rather than prescriptive
jurisdiction. They authorize the EEC Commission and Council to ensure
that non-EEC members play fair by requiring examination of their
conduct. "If, as a result of its reports (or at any other time), the
Commission finds that a third country does not grant the Community's
credit [or investment services] institution market access and competitive
opportunities comparable to those granted by the Community of third
country banks," the EEC Council and Parliament may restrict, bar,

168. Id.
169. This may also have antitrust implications. See generally Roe, supra note 69.
170. The Second Directive does call for cooperation and coordination of regulation
between the home and host country. In addition, the Second Directive also requires that
before a financial institution's stock may be bought "a bank must inform the competent
authorities so that their suitability can be appraised." EUROPEAN UPDATE, supra note 4,
§ 3.3.6.
171. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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suspend or limit the banks from the EEC.' 72
However, two schemes now in place will make EEC reciprocity
difficult. One type of regulation is cross-institutional (e.g., Glass-Steagall
and BHCA), and the other is cross-functional (e.g. custody of customer
assets in securities activities).'
B. A Recent U.S. Banking Amendment
One recent effort to lower barriers to U.S. banks' entry into the
securities business was the Senate Finance Committee's unsuccessful
proposals for the Improvement Act. 174 The Improvement Act had some
of its origins in a Presidential initiative to repeal Glass-Steagall, to amend
the BHCA accordingly, and to permit more interstate branching by
amending the McFadden Act. 75 The underlying premise was that, given
extreme competition from the securities industry, foreign entities, and
mutual funds, banks were forced to enter into risky loan business to try to
compensate for lost revenues. 76 Eliminating barriers to investment
banking and securities brokering would enable the banks to compete and
to recover their lost profit margins with very little downside risk, as
177
proposed by the Senate Bill.
However, by the time the bill got through the House, reform had
turned to retrenchment. The law, as passed, strengthens barriers to the
securities industry, 17 removes compensation schemes for purely foreign
business, 179 and restricts access further for foreign financial institutions
doing business in the United States. 80 All this comes at a time when
Europe is succeeding in creating a uniform financial services market.' 8 '

172. Second Directive, supra note 3, art. 9 § 3.
173. See supra notes 74 & 102 and accompanying texts.
174. S. REP. No. 167, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1991), available in WESTLAW,
GENFED Directory, LH Database.
175. The Bush Administration tried unsuccessfully to repeal the McFadden Act. See
id. at 61 et seq. In contrast to the theme of the First and Second Banking Directives,
U.S. banking laws substantially prohibit interstate branching of banks. National Banking
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (referred to as the McFadden Act).
176. S. REP. No. 167, supra note 174, at 28.
177. Id. at 142-57.
178. Improvement Act § 207.
179. Id. § 312.
180. Id. §§ 202-206.
181. First Directive, supra note 3, pmbl.
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Instead of looking to the securities industry for methods of protecting
customers, the main thrust of the Improvement Act was to provide the
depleted FDIC fund with additional borrowing capacity." 2
The prudential controls called for in the Improvement Act are
enhancement through additional auditing, reporting, and accounting
requirements.' 83 The Improvement Act also calls for additional federal
oversight of multi-state foreign branches and banks because an "individual
state does not have the authority to ensure that the multi-state operations
Act prohibits the
are properly supervised." 84 Finally, the Improvement
85
insurance of foreign deposits by the FDIC. 1
President Bush, while signing the law, expressed disappointment that
his version did not go through: "[My] proposal equally addressed the
fundamental problems of the banking industry . . . Unfortunately, the

narrow legislation produced by Congress does little more than provide
critical funding to the Bank Insurance Fund." 86 In accord with President
Bush's proposal, the Senate Committee recommended the repeal of GlassSteagall:
In retrospect, the more fundamental reforms growing out of the
financial crisis of the 1930[s], such as the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the Securities and Exchange Commission,
and the strengthening of the Federal Reserve Act . . . [have]

stood the test of time and practice. The Glass-Steagall separation
does not appear to have been an essential component .

reform]

187

[of the

However, the committee's recommendations go on to construct "fire
walls," prohibit extension of credit to securities affiliates for underwriting
activities, and require separate customer compensation schemes. 88 The
proposal seemed nothing more than an expedient way to infuse much
182. "This legislation falls far short of the truly comprehensive reform proposal that
niy Administration sent to Congress . . . I have decided to sign this legislation today
because of the critical need to replenish the Bank Insurance Fund." George Bush,

Statement on the Signing of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
of 1991, in 2 PUB. PAPERS GEORGE BUSH 1991 1649, 1649-50 (1992).
183. Improvement Act §§ 100- 112.
184. H.R. REP. No. 330, supra note 78, at 1919.
185. Id. at 1909.
186. Bush, supra note 182, at 1649.

187. S. REP. No. 167, supra note 174, at 346.
188. Id. at 528.
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needed capital into the banking industry at the expense of the securities
industry. With the FDIC compensation scheme intact, which is not a
deterrent for the industry as a whole, banks would still be able to engage
in risky commercial or foreign lending.' 8 9 As the Senate Report so
pointedly stated, "Securities affiliates must absorb their losses with their
own capital.

They will not be kept afloat .

. .

. They must bear their

own risks for their investment decisions and compete in the market
place. "'90
Securities broker-dealers do these things now.1 9' What benefit would
they derive from this proposal? Furthermore, unlike the industry-funded
compensation scheme of the securities business, bank risks are born by the
taxpayer.' 92 Thus, the taxpayer would have made out better if he bailed
out all the SIPC liquidations in the past 20 years, as compared to FDIC
payouts over the same period.' 93 A U.S. bias that permeates not only the

189. The Improvement Act enhanced certain prudential controls; however, it did little
to address the underlying cause of bank failures such as the competition from other
industries and institutions abroad. The Senate Report noted these concerns, but that
version of the President's bill was not passed. S. REP. No. 167, supra note 174.
190. Id. at 158.
191. Securities broker-dealers' assets are generally self-funding. Most of the assets are
readily marketable and thus provide for collateralized financing with banks, broker-dealers
and other institutional lenders. However, to the extent that they require unsecured
borrowings such as bank loans or issuance of commercial paper, there is systemic risk that
would extend to the banking community as well. This legislation was primarily the result
of the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. See H.R. REP. No. 524, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1449 (legislative history to
the Market Reform Act).
192. Although both banks and securities broker-dealers assess premiums to fund their
insurance trusts, the federal government is the "lender of last resort" for banks only.
Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 461 (1994). Under the Securities Investor Protection
Act of 1970, there is only a borrowing facility in place from the federal government. 15
U.S.C. § 78aaa et seq. (1994). As indicated by the government's lack of financial
assistance in regard to the Drexel Burnham Lambert Group collapse and its extreme
intervention in the near bankruptcy of Continental Illinois Bank, the securities industry
probably would not look to the government for financial assistance. See Michael E. Don
& Josephine Wang, Stockbroker Liquidations Under SIPA and Their Impact on Securities
Transfers, 12 CARDozo L. REV. 509, 512-13, n.13 (1992) ("In enacting SIPA in 1970,
Congress did not intend to bail out financially troubled broker-dealers").
193. See Ceasar, supra note 110, n. 11 (the FDIC has paid out over $15 billion since
its inception). The FSLIC has paid out over $500 billion, most of it in the past decade.
For the 24 years ended December 31, 1994, the total distribution for the accounts of
customers was less than $2 billion. SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION,
TWENTY-FOURTH

ANNUAL

REPORT OF

THE

SECURITIES

CORPORATION app. I (1995) [hereinafter SIPC Annual Report].
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legislature, but also academia, is that the nature of the securities business
If risk is measured by
is inherently" riskier than commercial banking.'
the amount of funds customers have lost in relation to their deposits or
investments, this is simply not the case. 9 6 Given the nature of banking

protection both here and abroad, taxpayers frequently pay for protected
depositors' balances. 97 However, under the U.S. securities laws, before
SIPC pays, SEC Rule 15c3-3 allows for the self-liquidation or transfer of
customer balances without the necessity of bankruptcy proceedings. 98
As one commentator noted, "[T ] he recent Treasury Report considers
enhanced capital standards and supervision as almost a universal solvent
for banking ills as a means to insure against many of the risks in the
system."' 99 As the Improvement Act demonstrates, the other fix-it is
government-backed insurance. 2°
C. ConstrainingU.S. Securities Broker-DealerRegulation
Securities regulators use both belts and suspenders. The products
(securities) are highly regulated through both the 1933 Act and the 1934
Act. 20 1 Customers receive so much information on a publicly traded

194. Certainly not empirically.
195. "In principle, banks and securities firms serve two distinctly different functions.
Banks are viewed as quasi-public institutions .... In contrast, securities firms are risktaking institutions. . . . In practice, the line between securities firms and banks is
considerably less distinct . . . . " Worth, supra note 79, at 136-140; but see Haberman,
supra note 8, at 2 n. 1 (author argues that the differences between the two are fundamental,
since the time horizons regarding risk profiles are significant). Thus, broker/dealer capital
standards and accounting reflect liquidation values, as time horizons are short, whereas
commercial lending capital standards reflect going concern risks and accounting. However,
the author seems to conclude that the two industries are becoming more and more alike
in the kinds of risks they undertake, See also Richard Dale, Regulating Banks' Securities
Activities: A Global Assessment, J.OF INT'L. SEC. MKTs., Winter 1991, at 287-88 (usual
analysis involving "fire walls" between the different functions).
196. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
197. Id.
198. H.R. REP. No. 524, supra note 191, at 1462-64.
199. Caesar, supra note 110, at 1528.
200. Id. at n.22.
201. Not only are the institutions that sell, distribute and underwrite securities subject
to extensive regulation under the 1934 Act and 1933 Act, but so are the issuers, who are
subject to periodic and special reporting requirements such as annual and quarterly
financial statements and proxy reports. RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES
REGULATION 151-85 (7th ed. 1992).
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stock °2 that they probably do not read very much of it. The activities of
brokerage firms are subject to the most complex capital rules in the world,
where even the regional stock exchanges and associations promulgate and
enforce financial and operational controls.2 3
Customer assets are
safeguarded by an entire range of quasi-industry type insurance schemes,
while customer-owned assets are fully segregated. 2" With insurance and
Rule 15c3-3, net capital becomes redundant to a broker-dealer, at least so
far as customers are concerned. Of course, lenders and other noncustomer
creditors are certainly entitled to protection too, at the very least to avoid
or mitigate systemic catastrophes.2 5
What is even more difficult to reconcile is the fact that customers of
broker-dealers decide in what they are investing or to whom they are
lending their money by purchasing the stocks, bonds, and mutual funds of
their choice. In contrast, bank depositors generally have no idea where
their money is invested, as this is decided entirely by the bank. If
customers of broker-dealers are choosing their own credit and market
risks, why should they be more protected than depositors who have no say
as to where their money goes? Both institutions are really nothing more
than financial intermediaries; 2 6 and as discussed earlier, the ultimate risk
bearer for the bank is the federal government, while this is not the case
with the securities industry.
However, as the FDIC is almost depleted, SIPC has been overfunded
to the point where it has ceased assessing its members for almost five
years.20 7 The entire blame for this result does not lie with Congress.

202. Id. at 151-2.
203. All SEC registered broker-dealers must also become members of the National

Association of Securities Dealers, and of every securities and commodities exchange on
which they trade. For a large securities and commodities dealer this could well involve
over a dozen regulators, each with its own set of rules. JENNINGS, supra note 201, at 56270.
204. Broker-dealers are not only covered by SIPC, but generally purchase through

private insurance carriers multi-million dollar blanket-bond insurance. In addition, under
Rule 15c3-3, broker-dealers must segregate net customer assets and otherwise not employ
any customer assets in proprietary business. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3.
205. Insurance and the protection guaranteed by Rule 15c3-3 generally would fully

cover customers of a broker-dealer only. Net capital should thus be protection for all other
creditors such as banks, other broker-dealers and commercial paper holders. For
arguments in favor of controlling systemic risk, see H.R. REP. No. 524, supra note 191.
206. Haberman, supra note 8, at 2 n.1 (i.e., vehicles that match up borrowers or

capital users of money, with lenders or investors.)
207. Assessments were resumed in 1989-90. SIPC
at 9.

ANNUAL REPORT,

supra note 193,
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Great deference has been given to the SEC and the Federal Reserve Bank
regulators; in fact, in some cases, regulations appear to exceed
Congressional intent. For example, neither the 1934 Act nor the
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 ("SIPA") prohibits the use of
customer assets in firm business.20 8 In fact, complete segregation of
customer assets did not occur until after the enactment of the rule in
1973.209

The SEC justifies the 1973 rule on many bases. First, Congress
became concerned with the failure of broker-dealers in the late 1960s. 21
During this period, as a result of an increase in stock exchange volume,
some brokerage houses lost control of their recordkeeping regarding which
assets belonged to the firm arid which belonged to the customers.2 1 1 It
should be recalled that during this period, the largest firms had neither
automated records nor centralized securities processing and depositories.2 2
Even before the crisis, the industry attempted to protect customers by
setting up exchange-sponsored trust funds,213 but these soon proved
inadequate.21 4
Congress responded with overregulation, amended the 1934 Act, and
enacted the SIPA.21 5 Congress recognized that "free credit balances are
funds left with a broker-dealer firm by customers who have an unrestricted
right to withdraw them on demand. . . but [nonetheless] may be and are
208. Section 15(c)(3) of the 1934 Act comes the closest to requiring segregation, and

certainly does not seem to mandate 100% reserves of net customer assets: "Such rules and
regulations shall (A) require the maintenance of reserves with respect to customer deposits
or credit balances. . . ." Similarly, the SIPA Congress defers to the above, and simply
states, "The Commission [is] ...to promulgate rules with respect to .

.

.the carrying

aild use of customer deposits or credit balances." H.R. REP. No. 1613, 91st Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5254.
209. Adoption of Rule 15c3-3 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange

Act Release No. 9,856, 38 Fed. Reg. 6,277 (Mar. 8, 1973).
210. H.R. No. 1613, supra note 208, at 5255.
211. Id. at 5255.
212. Id. All records were prepared manually and all certificates were in physical
form. Large volume meant tremendous volumes of paper were necessary to transfer
securities. Id.

213. Id. at 5256.
214. Id. at 5265-66.
215. The Senate Finance Committee noted much later that Congressional reaction to
a crisis usually involves over legislating. For example, they point out that as a result of
the 1929 stock market crash and the ensuing bank failures, Congress reacted with a wave
of legislation, but the only two they now consider necessary were the Securities Acts and
the FDIC Act. S. REP. No. 167, supra note 174, at 149.
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used by broker-dealers [for any proprietary purpose]. "216 Although
Congress did not affirmatively mandate that free credit balances be
segregated, it did authorize the SEC to promulgate regulations in regard
to them. 217 Free credit balances in 1970 and 1969 were estimated at $2.0
billion and $3.7 billion, respectively. 218 Through the enactment of Rule
15c3-3, the SEC reduced the money supply overnight. 2' 9 However,
Congress was more concerned with the use of customer securities.
Through amendments to the 1934 Act, it prohibited the use of fully paid
for or excess margin securities in firm business without the customer's
written consent. 220 The greater concern with securities than with cash is
not easily explainable. It probably has more to do with a lack of
understanding of the way securities are accounted for and deployed by the
firm, rather than any concern over how they are treated in bankruptcy or
whether they are prone to conversion more so than cash. 22 ' Nevertheless,
the SEC rule amendments require that all such securities be reduced to
"possession or control" within twenty-four hours with certain limited
exceptions. 222 In the U.S., banks are subject to rules identical to those
applied to broker-dealers based on a functional analysis per the 1934 Act.
However, per the BHCA, broker-dealer activities must be performed in a
separate affiliate of a bank holding company.223 The SEC, however,
would in substance have primary jurisdiction over the securities affiliate.224
216. H.R. No. 1613, supra note 208, at 5255.
217. Id. at 5256.

218. Id. at 5255.
219. By requiring that free credit balances be segregated, firms no longer could use
those monies to finance proprietary activities. Thus, to the extent broker-dealers had to
increase borrowing, the money supply was reduced. Arguably, to the extent that the
overall financing requirements of the firm and customers did not change (since money is
fungible), the money supply would be unaffected. However, given that most brokerdealers have net customer assets, which would require a deposit requirement, the latter

conclusion is unlikely.
220. Securities Exchange Act § 8(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78h(c) (1994).
221. For an extensive discussion of the bankruptcy implications of a SIPC liquidation
in regard to bulk segregation of securities, see Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond
Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled

by Intermediaries, 12 CARDoZO L. REv. 305 (1993).
222. SEC Rule 15c3-3(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(d) (1993).
223. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
224. Under § 12(i) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1994), and the Bank Holding
Company Act, banking regulators appear to have primary jurisdiction. However, the SEC
maintains that it has such, and the Federal Reserve seems to have acquiesced. See, e.g.,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Regulations, 12 C.FR. §§ 5, 11, 16 (1993)
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Finally, at the same time that it issued Rule 15a-6, the SEC also asked
for comments on recognition of foreign regulation for foreign entities
activities abroad (the Concept Release).225 This endeavor has apparently
been put on hold, as no regulation recognizing foreign requirements has
since been issued.226 The SEC made it clear that the Concept Release was
not advocating a reciprocity approach. If the foreign broker-dealer fell
within the prescriptive jurisdiction of the U.S. regulatory scheme, it would
remain subject to the SEC registration requirements, unless otherwise
exempt.
Furthermore, the conditional exemption is not applicable to any
foreign broker-dealer which has a U.S. broker-dealer affiliate. In fact, the
Concept Release appears to do little more than parallel Rule 15a-6:
The SEC believes that a cooperative approach to the
regulation of a foreign broker-dealer conducting a limited
business from outside the United States with major U.S.
institutional investors deserves serious consideration . . . [b]y

relying in certain limited circumstances on comparable foreign
227
regulation as a substitute for U.S. regulation ....
Although the Concept Release appeared to be the first step toward
reciprocity, 22 the approach taken in Rule 15a-6, disproves this
perception. 229

(incorporating by reference the SEC's regulations). As one commentator has noted,
regardless of § 12(i), the SEC has plenary authority over all registrants. Michael P.
Malloy, The 12(i) ed Monster: Administration of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by
the Federal Bank Regulatory Agencies, 19 HoFsTRA L. REv. 269, 270 (1990).

Most European countries do not draw such fine distinctions between banks and
broker-dealers-e.g., "Germany's present structure is characterized by a universal banking
system with a broad banking definition. Virtually every security-dealing activity is
classified as banking and requires a banking license under German law." Gerhard Wegen,
Transnational Financial Services-Current Challenges for an Integrated Europe, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. S91, S103 (1992).
The EEC Directives provide for overlapping activities as well. CAD, supra note 8;
see also supra note 152.

225. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
226. Concept Release, supra note 61; see GAO Says SEC Should ConsiderRevisions
to CapitalRule as to Foreign Markets, [1992 File Binder] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)

No. 12,
227.
228.
229.

at 383 (Mar. 20, 1992).
Concept Release, supra note 61, at 30,088.
Trachtman, supra note 52, at 279-80.
See supra notes 67- 69 and accompanying text.
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D. The EEC's Uniform License and Reciprocity Approach
Putting aside issues of proof and enforcement, the reciprocity
approach could logically and should inevitably lead to a race to the
bottom. For example, if a German universal bank, which under German
law is permitted to conduct practically all of the Annex 1 activities under
German law, decides to open shop in a country that prohibits or limits
universal banking, it may have a competitive advantage over the host
countries' domestic financial institutions.230
In the previous example, what would be the incentive for the host
country not to amend its regulations to be more consistent with German
law? As one author has observed, "[The] potential for regulatory arbitrage
is expected to cause laws and regulations throughout the Member States
to converge toward the list of permissible activities contained in the
Annex." 23' The host country that is less permissive than the home state
runs the risk of allowing its own financial institution to be at a competitive
disadvantage and perhaps become a no-longer viable concern.
Others have observed that "adherents to this concept generally ignore
historical precedent. The New York and London markets have emerged
as the largest international markets despite having the two most
comprehensive securities regulatory systems in the world." 232 However,
this phenomenon probably has more to do with where technology and
certain populations are centered, rather than with indifference to
regulation. Others argue that EEC firms will not seek regulatory arbitrage
opportunities because "domestic EC institutions would [not] relinquish
decades (if not centuries) of accumulated administrative and political voice
in their Home state for anticipated benefits from other jurisdictions." 233
But this reasoning overlooks the speed with which financial markets
change.234 Only the agile survive in rapidly changing markets. Another

argument made is that because the financial standards are uniform under
230. See discussion supra part III. C.
231.

Fisher, supra note 113, at 240.

232. Warren, supra note 113, at 187.

233. Matthews, supra note 114, at 95.
234. The market in cross-borderofferings of bonds, including foreign and Eurobonds,
expanded form $38 billion in 1980 to $238 billion in 1988. The value of equity-related

securities offered to investors in markets outside the issuers' home state grew from $200
million in 1983 to 20.3 billion in 1987 . . . land although foreign purchases of U.S.
securities grew at a fast clip] ... United States gross purchases and sales of foreign debt

and equity securities grew from $35.2 billion and $17.9 billion in 1980 to $405.9 billion
and $189.4 billion, respectively in 1987. Warren, supra note 113 at 1.
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the EEC directives, this will mitigate the effects of regulatory arbitrage.235
But as discussed earlier, this is only true at least to the extent that there
is no cross-institutional arbitrage through the establishment of different
23 6
legal entities under the ISD and Second Directive for similar businesses.
Finally, two other opportunities exist as a result of the directives'
reciprocity provision itself. The provision provides that all EEC member
states act in unison to bar non-member firms unless the non-member state
gives all EEC members reciprocal treatment.237 This could have
monopolistic effects both within the Community for firms that are not
following the Directives and with other third country financial institutions.
In addition, because of the grandfathering of legal entities that already
have a license in an EEC state prior to the effective date of the directives,
branches of these firms should incorporate prior to such date.238
Otherwise, they will be subject to the host countries' laws or not permitted
to remain. However, being subject to the host country's laws in some
cases could be beneficial as discussed earlier.2 3 9
V.

CONCLUSION

As one commentator indicated, the logical effect of the EEC directives
is for financial conglomerates and universal banking to become
commonplace in Europe. 240 This is at a time when the U.S. regulators
appear to be retrenching and, in some cases, proposing rules that would
increase regulatory arbitrage. This may result in a protectionist reaction
by the EEC.241
If Europe is to seriously consider recommendations for a framework
almost identical to that of the U.S., it must examine further whether that
framework has indeed worked in the U.S. It should also examine what its
experiences have been with regard to its own institutions. Finally, it
should be noted that U.S. rules have been difficult to work with and

235. Mathews, supra note 114, at 96.
236. See discussion supra part III C.
237. Second Directive, supra note 3, pmbl.; ISD, supra note 6, art. 6
238. Warren, supra note 113, at 203.
239. For example, a foreign bank doing business as a branch of a nonuniversal bank
country may prefer to remain subject to the nonuniversal bank country's jurisdiction rather
than the EEC's directives. See discussion supra part II. C.
240. Jan Schuijer, Banks Under Stress; Analysis of Recent Developments in Banking,
OECD OBSERVER, Dec. 1991, at 19.
241. Brittan, supra note 79.
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overly complex.242
As a first step, the best alternative to existing schemes, both in
Europe and in the U.S., is to amend Glass-Steagall-type barriers. 243 This
could be achieved by extending the SEC's customer segregation
requirements to bank deposits held in the resulting financial
conglomerates, while "reserving" a percentage of these assets at an
amount greater than the current insignificant percentages but less than the
100% required under the securities laws. This framework could, of
course, be supplemented by capital adequacy guidelines, industry
insurance and guarantee funds, and maintenance of custody rules for trust
departments. The greater challenge would be to move toward universal
However, even in the EEC, universal banking is not
banking.
commonplace. The effects of permitting universal banking worldwide
probably should be examined further as this particular race to the bottom
could be deleterious for the same reasons the BHCA was passed in the
U.S.
With rapid globalization of the financial markets, measured
deregulation, jurisdiction by jurisdiction, may be cumbersome. An
international commission similar to the EEC's that has legislative and
enforcement authority greater than the present voluntary organizations such
as the Basle Accord and IOSCO appears to be necessary. 24
Harmonization of the rules and coordination of surveillance and
enforcement appears to be the only solution. Otherwise, there will be the
search for the least restrictive, lowest cost means to execute identical
transactions in the same market. Jurisdictional conflicts will inevitably
result. In the meantime, whether by design or default, there are
opportunities within the EEC market for regulatory arbitrage in the
securities area. These opportunities depend upon whether the form of the
financial institution is a bank or securities broker-dealer and which
regulator has jurisdiction.
Frederick W. Gerkens

242. Brittan Urges U.S. to Consider EC Firns in Financial Reforms, 1992-THE
EUR. ,JUNWtCATi1N, Ian. 25, t99 I, availablein LEXIS, Europe Library,
EURWCH File.
243. See supra notes 75-86 & 93-103 and accompanying text.
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244. See Warren, supra note 113, at 189 n.21.

